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Border Enforcement and Selection of Mexican Immigrants 
in the United States
* 
 
Since 1986 the United States has made considerable efforts to curb illegal immigration. This 
has resulted in an increase in migration costs for undocumented immigrants. More stringent 
border enforcement either deters potential illegal immigrants from coming to the U.S., or 
moves the point of crossing for illegal immigrants from traditional crossing routes to more 
inhospitable routes. These changes are likely to place a heavier burden on illegal immigrant 
women as they are more likely to be kidnapped, smuggled, or raped when crossing illegally. 
If migration costs are not the same for all migrants, higher migrating costs may result in a 
change in the number and in the composition of immigrants to the United States. In the face 
of higher migration costs, only immigrants with relatively high expected benefits of migration 
will choose to migrate. Based on our theoretical model, we test for three empirical results that 
are associated with a stronger selection of immigrant women from Mexico relative to men as 
a result of higher migration costs: 1) A decrease in the relative flow of older and highly 
educated undocumented immigrant women relative to men; 2) A change in the skill 
composition of immigrant women to men; and 3) An increase in the average earnings of 
those groups most affected by increased migration costs. Using data from the 1990, 2000 
Decennial Census, and from the 2006-2008 American Community Survey we empirically 
confirm these predictions. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J1, J2, J3, J6 
  





Fernando A. Lozano 
Department of Economics 
Pomona College 
425 N. College Ave 
Claremont, CA 91711 
USA 
E-mail: fernando.lozano@pomona.edu   
 
                                                 
* We thank Eleanor Brown, Deborah Cobb-Clark, Sandy Darity, Marie Mora, Roberto Pedace and 
Carlos Vargas, as well as three anonymous referees for their comments. We also thank seminar 
participants at RSSS The Australia National University, Monash University and the Labor Seminar at 
UC Santa Barbara, and participants at the 2007 WEIA Meetings and at the 2007 SEA Meetings. All 
errors remain our own. 1 Introduction
Mexico represents the largest source of migration to the United States with 32 percent of all immigrants
originating from Mexico (Passel 2008). Prior to the 1980s, Mexican migrants to the U.S. were predominantly
men, but there has since been a shift in the gender composition of Mexican immigrants (Marcelli and
Cornelius, 2001). In 2008, the female share of the foreign-born population from Mexico stood at 43 percent
(U.S. Census). As a result, economists have shifted attention towards the migration decisions and labor
market outcomes of Mexican immigrant women relative to immigrant men. Recent work by Blau and Kahn
(2007), for example, examines gender and assimilation of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. The authors nd
that Mexican immigrant women exhibit faster wage and employment convergence to U.S. native levels than
Mexican immigrant men do. In addition, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) examine the selection of Mexican
immigrants in the U.S. They suggest that positive selection of immigrants may occur if migration costs
are not constant across skill levels, but decrease with increasing levels of schooling. They nd that based
on observable skills, Mexican immigrant women in the U.S. fall in the upper tail of the Mexican wage
distribution. That is, according to Chuiquiar and Hanson (2005), Mexican women are positively selected
relative to those women that remain in the source country. This is in contrast to their nding that Mexican
immigrant men are intermediately selected. While these studies reveal gender dierences in the selection
and assimilation of Mexican immigrants, the factors driving such gender dierences continue to remain
unexplored. The current study contributes to the literature by providing a framework to analyze gender
dierences in immigrant selection in the face of changing migration costs.
The past thirty years have been a period of increased unauthorized Mexican migration1. It is estimated
that more than half of the 12.7 million Mexican immigrants currently residing in the U.S. are unauthorized
(Passel 2008). Estimates also show that, since the 1990s, 80 to 85 percent of the annual migration from Mexico
to the U.S. has consisted of unauthorized immigrants (Passel 2005). In response to this demographic shock,
the US government heightened enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico border. The Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, which included both an employer sanction program and a border enforcement
program, marked the beginning of a series of border enforcement policy changes. This was followed by
1For a review of the literature on unauthorized migration from Mexico see Hanson (2006).
1Operation Hold the Line in Texas, Operation Gatekeeper in California, and Operation Safeguard in Arizona,
where a signicant amount of resources were devoted to controlling undocumented immigration and making
it more dicult for migrants to cross through the traditional crossing channels. For example, between 1992
and 2007, the annual budget for border enforcement operations increased from $400 million to $1.94 billion
(Hendricks 2007). In addition, new technological resources such as night vision cameras, ground sensors,
and infrared surveillance equipment were adopted (Eschbach et al. 2003, Hendricks 2007).
However, research shows that despite the substantial additional resources employed for border policing,
there is no concluding evidence that the border enforcement policies of the 1990s were successful in reducing
undocumented immigration. In fact, the enforcement policies either created a large diversion eect or
increased the length of time spent in the U.S. (Angelluci 2005, Sorensen and Carrion-Flores 2006). That is,
more stringent border enforcement has resulted in a shift of migrant trac from urban areas to inhospitable
areas, such as the Arizona desert, which have created signicant consequences for migrants (Hendricks
2007). For example, the General Accounting Oce (GAO, 2006) reports that from late 1998 through 2005
the number of migrant border-crossing deaths doubled. The increase in deaths was more dramatic for women,
where the number of deaths increased from 9 percent in 1998 to 21 percent in 2005. Reports by Mexico's
Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores (Foreign Aairs Ministry) show that more than 3,500 immigrants died
while crossing the border in 2009, and 58 percent of them are women (Hernandez, 2009). There have also
been reports of increased violence along the border such as gunghts, hijackings, rapes, and assault (Wall
St. Journal Oct. 2007). Thus, it appears that the stringent border enforcement policies of the past 20 years
have led to an increase in migration costs with the costs falling predominantly on immigrant women.
Evidence of the greater costs can be seen in Figure 1A, which shows average coyote prices for household
heads that migrated to the U.S. illegally.2 Not only have coyote costs increased since the 1990s, but the
costs have been greater for women than for men. Donato and Patterson (2004) nd that following the
implementation of the IRCA, women were more likely than men to use coyotes to cross the border. The
extensive use of coyotes by women and the dramatic increase in deaths among women crossing the border
may be an indication of the greater risks that women face relative to men when crossing the border.
In this paper, we examine the extent to which greater migration costs, as a result of more stringent border
2See also Gathmann (2004) who nds evidence that coyote prices are higher for migrants during years of expanded border
enforcement.
2enforcement, has changed the composition of Mexican immigrant women relative to Mexican immigrant men.
Our main hypothesis is that the stringent border enforcement policies of the past 20 years have led to an
increase in migration costs, which may in turn have aected the composition of Mexican immigrants in
the U.S. More importantly, we argue that these costs, which include greater physical risks in crossing the
border and greater psychic costs of being unable to return temporarily to the source country, fall more
heavily on undocumented immigrant women. A change in the composition of Mexican immigrant women
relative to men is evidenced by a change in their demographic characteristics and in a change in their labor
market outcomes. In particular, we develop a theoretical framework which allows us to test whether higher
migration costs that fall predominantly on women will reduce the number of high skilled, older immigrant
women, relative to demographically equivalent men. In addition, we show that the changes in earnings across
dierent cohorts of immigrants from Mexico are greatest among these groups, suggesting stronger selection
of immigrants.
2 Theoretical Framework
It is commonly believed that most immigrants in the U.S. posses little formal skills. For example, Borjas
(1987) predicts that immigrants with low schooling levels will be drawn from countries where low-skill labor
is abundant and income inequality is large, as their returns from migration are high. In contrast to low
skilled workers, returns to education will be relatively high for highly educated workers when their skills are
scarce in the source economy. Therefore, Borjas' analysis suggests that the source country distribution of
skills and income will create incentives for low-skill workers to migrate while high-skill workers remain in the
source country.
Borjas' empirical analysis supports his predictions, where immigrants from countries where unskilled labor
is abundant tend to have worse labor market outcomes in the US economy than other immigrants. Similarly,
Cobb-Clark (1993) addresses the issue of self-selection among immigrant women and her ndings support
Borjas' negative selection hypothesis. She shows that immigrant women from countries with high levels
of GDP, low income inequality, and low returns to education tend to exhibit higher U.S. wages. However,
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) argue that if migration costs are not held constant, but decrease with skills,
3then migrants from countries with high levels of income inequality can be negatively selected or positively
selected. The authors suggest that migration costs may decline with schooling if highly educated migrants
are more able to comply with bureaucratic requirements or face fewer credit constraints compared to less
skilled migrants. Incorporating dierences in migration costs across men and women into the framework,
we hypothesize that migration costs may vary by gender with female migrants incurring greater costs than
men. Thus, a resident of Mexico of gender g in an age category indexed by j and a skill level indexed by i








gjit (a))   Cgjit(a)>0 (1)
The summation starts with t0 which is the age in which the migrant comes to the U.S. and ends at tN which
is the age when the immigrant retires from work or returns to the source country   the length of the "labor
migration" is tN  t0. The rst term in the inequality is the dierence in expected earnings between Mexico
and the US. This dierence is compounded across time with the discount factor . The second term in the
inequality is the cost of migration, which here is assumed to be xed and imposed on the migrant at the time
of migration. While we assume that costs within a gender-age-skill group are constant, we assume that the
costs can vary across gender groups. Note that both costs and wages depend on the ability of the potential
immigrant which is denoted by a.
The top panel in Figure 2 presents the costs and benets of migration. We assume that @C
@a < 0 and
@w
@a > 0, and that a is a measure of the distribution of ability in Mexico: a  uniform[0,1] and it is known
to the potential migrant. This distribution is depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 2. For any given time,
only immigrants within a gender-age-skill group with an ability level a  a will choose to migrate and
those with ability level a < a will stay in Mexico. The equilibrium is depicted in the top panel of Figure 2
where the expected benet from migration equals the cost from migration at level of ability a, again only
1 a potential immigrants will choose to migrate. An increase in the migration costs due to more stringent
border enforcement will shift the cost function to the right for every ability level, as these costs have gone
up. This shift is represented in Figure 2 with the shift from C(a) to C'(a), and now the new equilibrium is
at the ability level a and only immigrants with a level of ability above that will choose to migrate. The
4distance between a and a represents the number of immigrants who would have migrated under the old
cost levels, but choose not to now under the higher cost levels.
There are two major reasons why migration costs may vary by gender. First, women's migration responses
may be more sensitive to changes in immigration enforcement since they are more vulnerable to the physical
dangers of crossing the border illegally. As a result of the border policies of the 1990s, women now face
a greater probability of becoming lost and being robbed, raped, or kidnapped because they are forced to
cross the border in more inhospitable regions. Falc on (2007) documents multiple instances of rape along the
U.S.-Mexico border. Second, migrant women are more likely than men to make multiple trips across the
border because they act as the main caretakers of their children or elder parents. Hondagneu-Sotelo and
Avila (2007) suggest that as the number of female-headed households in Mexico and Central America has
increased, more women are leaving their children in the source country in order to seek employment in the
U.S. These women return home to visit their children when it is nancially and logistically possible. Any
U.S. immigration policy that increases the costs of crossing the border will also make it more dicult for
these migrants to return to Mexico temporarily in the event of a family emergency. As a result, the psychic
costs involved with being far from one's family and unable to return to the source country on a temporary
basis may fall more heavily on women. For example, Reyes (2004) nds that there was a sharp decline in the
probability of return trips in the late 1990s and suggests that it is a result of greater border enforcement.
Figure 1B shows the duration of stay for the average migrant's rst undocumented trip to the U.S. Not
only do women have a longer duration of stay in the U.S. than men, but the increase in the duration of
stay over time has been more pronounced for women than for men. Between 1982 and 2008, the duration
of stay increased by slightly over 43 months for undocumented Mexican men, but by almost 60 months for
undocumented Mexican women. If we assume that returning temporarily to the source country in order
to be with parents, children, or other family members is desirable, then without loss of generality this cost
can also increase with t. Our premise is that border enforcement makes Cwomen;jit > Cmen;jit , therefore a
female immigrant should perceive a higher expected wage gain from migrating than an immigrant male.
It is impossible to directly estimate the eect that increased border enforcement has on the selection of
undocumented immigrants into the United States. Ideally, we would need to observe all potential immigrants
in Mexico and assign them to dierent border patrol scenarios, then we would need to evaluate whether
5the ability of immigrant women changed across dierent border enforcement scenarios. Of course this
is empirically impossible. Instead, we use equation (1) to predict how dierent immigrant groups would
behave with an increase in costs. Several inferences can be derived from equation (1). First, as migration
costs increase, the number of immigrants should decrease, ceteris paribus 3 , as the new costs will be greater
than the expected benets for some potential migrants.
Second, the gains in earnings from migration are accrued across the expected length of the migration.
Therefore, equation (1) predicts that the sum of relative earnings in the U.S. is greater for younger workers
than for older workers, making migration more attractive to younger workers. This is consistent with
empirical evidence that shows that migration rates from Mexico are highest for young adults (Chiquiar and
Hanson 2005). As costs increase, we would expect holding all else constant to see fewer Mexicans migrating
to the U.S., both old and young. However, the slowdown in migration should be larger for older workers
than for younger workers.
Third, following Borjas (1987), since Mexico is abundant in less educated labor and the U.S. is abundant
in highly educated labor, then the relative earnings for highly educated workers in Mexico are greater than
the relative earnings of these same workers were they to migrate to the U.S. Under this assumption, equation
(1) suggests that the expected gains in earnings from migration will be greater for less educated Mexican
immigrants than for highly educated Mexican immigrants. As a result, less educated Mexicans will be
more likely to migrate to the U.S. than highly educated Mexicans. An increase in migration costs holding
everything else constant will result in fewer Mexicans migrating to the U.S., both low and highly educated.
However, since the benet of migration is smaller for highly educated Mexicans, an increase in costs will
result in a decrease among the highly educated that is greater than among the lower educated. Note that this
is consistent with the relative deprivation hypothesis suggested by Stark and Taylor (1989) where potential
immigrants decide to migrate as a function of the gains from migration relative to a reference group in the
source country. Finally, if border costs fall more heavily on women, then we would expect to observe that
the decrease in the migration of skilled and older workers are larger for women relative to men.
3Of course there will be factors in the source and host economy that will determine migration ows regardless of border
enforcement, but theoretically we hold these constant.
63 Data and Descriptive Patterns
To evaluate changes in the composition of Mexican immigrants, we use data from the 5-percent Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) for the Census years 1990 and 2000 and for the American Community
Survey years 2006 through 2008. 4 We restrict our analysis to individuals between the ages of 16-64 who
were born in Mexico. In order to isolate the undocumented population, we further restrict our sample in
most of our analysis to recent immigrants or those who migrated within 5 years of the survey year. Recent
immigrants are more likely to be illegal immigrants (Hanson 2006). We also focus much of our analysis on
single immigrant men and women. As marriage and fertility rates have declined within several countries, the
prevalence of "tied movers" is diminishing and women are more likely to migrate in response to economic
incentives. In addition, we restrict our sample to adult immigrants or those individuals that migrated to the
U.S. at the age of 16 years or older. This restriction ensures that our sample consists of immigrants who
received most of their schooling abroad and not in the U.S. As we are interested in all immigrants, we also
do not exclude the self-employed from our sample. All monetary values are in real dollars.
Census data does not include information on legal status. Thus even after restricting the sample to recent
immigrants, our sample may still include both undocumented and legal immigrants. After evaluating various
sources of data on undocumented immigrants, Hanson (2006) argues that there is currently no reliable source
of data on the undocumented. Even the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), which is a rich household survey
conducted in winter months in rural communities in Mexico and includes data on legal status, suers from
several problems. First, the MMP is not representative of Mexico, Mexican immigrants, or the undocumented
population in the U.S. (Hanson 2006, Durand and Massey 2004). The MMP suers from sampling bias in
that it is comprised of only rural households and households residing in communities with high migration
propensities. The MMP communities have extensive experience crossing the border and have strong ties
with coyotes. Thus, the MMP migrants may be less responsive to shocks in border enforcement policies that
raise the costs of migration (Hanson 2006). In addition, only migrants who have returned to Mexico are
surveyed directly. Migrants currently residing in the U.S. are not direclty surveyed. Second, Hanson (2006)
documents that the seasonal migrants represented in the MMP are not consistent with the demographic and
4The analysis does not include 1980 data as a result of the impact that the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
might have on the ow of recent immigrants.
7labor market characteristics of the undocumented population found in other data sources. Finally, the MMP
suers from a gender bias in that the sample of undocumented immigrants is overwhelmingly comprised of
immigrant men. This hinders our ability to study trends in the migration patterns of women relative to men
across various age and schooling groups.
While it is commonly believed that the undocumented are not represented in household Census data,
estimates using the residual method show that the number of immigrants enumerated in the Census is too
large for them all to be legal (Hanson 2006).5 In addition, recent estimates using Census data suggest
that 56 percent of the Mexican immigrant population is undocumented (Passel 2005). As the costs of legal
migration have also risen (longer wait times for permanent legal residence visas), more than half of the new
immigrants from Mexico are those adjusting from illegal status to permanent legal residence status (Hanson
2006). Therefore, even the legal immigrants represented in the Census may have entered the U.S. unlawfully.
Despite the problems associated in capturing a representative sample of undocumented immigrants in both
the Census and the MMP, the large number of Mexican immigrant women represented in the Census makes
it the preferable database for this study.
Along this paper we will compare outcomes of Mexican immigrants with other Latin American immigrants
or Mexicans who choose to stay in Mexico. Because greater U.S.-Mexico border enforcement may inuence
the migration decision of all potential migrants, we assume that Mexican immigrants would be the group
most directly aected by greater migration costs. Thus, we would expect that any changes in migration
patterns will be stronger for Mexican immigrants compared to other Latin American immigrants. We
use the Decennial Census Data to evaluate labor market outcomes of Latin American immigrants in the
U.S. In addition, we present information on labor market outcomes for Mexicans who choose to stay in
Mexico. To evaluate the labor market outcomes of non-migrants in Mexico, we use data from the Mexican
Decennial Census Data (available in the IPUMS collection) and the Encuesta Nacional Ingreso Gasto de los
Hogares (ENIGH). The ENIGH is a household income and expenditure survey conducted regularly among a
nationally representative sample of Mexican households. This survey contains demographic and labor market
information for each member of the household. Again, we restrict our analysis to individuals between the
ages of 16-64.
5The residual method takes the dierence between the measured foreign-born population and the sum of past legal immigrant
ows.
8Summary statistics for the sample of Mexican immigrants are shown in Table 1. As Table 1 reveals,
Mexican immigrant women earn approximately 10 percent less than what Mexican immigrant men earn.
They are also much less likely than men to be employed, more likely to be married, and are older than
immigrant men. The average years of schooling is also slightly higher for Mexican immigrant women.
Summary statistics are also included in Table 1 when the sample is restricted to other immigrants from
Latin America and the Caribbean. First, the gender dierences that we observe among Mexican immigrants
are also evident among other Latin American immigrants. Second, wages, years of schooling, and age are all
slightly greater for other Latin American immigrants than for Mexican immigrants.
Figure 3 shows the proportion of female immigrants across time for Mexican immigrants and for other
immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean. If the costs of migration increase and if these weigh
more heavily on immigrant women, then we would expect to observe that the proportion of women migrating
is declining. In addition, given that the majority of undocumented immigrants are from Mexico and because
Mexican immigrants are more directly impacted by more stringent U.S.-Mexico border enforcement, we
would expect to see that the decline in the proportion of women migrating is larger for Mexican immigrants
than for other Latin American immigrants. Yet the gure shows that the proportion of women is declining
slightly over time for both Mexican immigrants and other Latin American immigrants and the decline is
similar for both groups. As we fail to see an statistically greater decrease in the proportion of female
Mexican immigrants across time than for other Latin American immigrants, we now turn to see if the age
and education characteristics of these immigrants dier as equation (1) above would predict.
Figure 4A shows the proportion of female immigrants by age category. Higher migration costs should
result in lower proportions of women migrating for all age categories. However, the slowdown should be
larger for older immigrants. Since 1990, the proportion of female immigrants from Mexico has decreased
the most among older immigrants (those 38 years and older). The proportion declined only slightly for the
youngest immigrants. Thus over the same time that U.S. border policies have raised the costs of crossing the
border, we observe a decrease in the proportion of older immigrant women relative to younger immigrant
women. We also compare the proportion of female Mexican immigrants in the U.S. to other Latin American
immigrants in the U.S. (see Figure 4B) While, the proportion of older female Latin American immigrants has
also declined over time, the decline is much less pronounced than what we observe for Mexican immigrants.
9Figure 5A shows the proportion of female immigrants from Mexico by education categories. While the
proportion of women has decreased over time among Mexican immigrants with less than 9 years of education,
it has remained relatively unchanged among college graduates. This is in contrast to what is predicted with
Equation (1), which suggests that the ratio would fall more among highly educated immigrants than among
less educated immigrants. We also compare the trend of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. to residents in
Mexico. Figure 5B shows that the proportion of female college graduates has increased while the proportion
of women with less than 9 years of schooling has declined only slightly. The trends observed in Figure 5B are
not surprising given that schooling in Mexico over the past two decades has increased. In addition, Lopez-
Acevedo (2006) nds that schooling increased in Mexico between 1988 and 2002, but that Mexican women
increased their educational attainment more than men. Figure 5B shows that as schooling has increased in
Mexico, it seems that more highly educated migrants are choosing to stay in Mexico. That is, if we compare
the trends between Mexicans who stay in Mexico and those who migrate, the fact that the proportion of
highly educated immigrants in the U.S. is not increasing may be a consequence of the prediction from our
model (and suggests that immigrants are not randomly drawn from the population). In the next section we
describe our empirical strategy to explore these hypothesis formally.
4 Empirical Strategy
This paper attempts to determine if changes in the migration patterns of women are the result of changes in
the migration costs since the 1990's. While migration costs can inuence the decision to migrate, other push
and pull factors may also be responsible for the migration patterns of Mexican immigrants. For example,
trade liberalization has resulted in an increase in income inequality in Mexico. Greater income inequality
may be the factor driving migration from Mexico to the U.S. In addition, the 1990's marked one of the longest
U.S. economic expansions. Thus, the economic expansion may have pulled individuals from Mexico to the
United States. In order to control for the changes in the push and pull factors that inuence the decision to
migrate, we employ a dierence-in-dierence and a dierence-in-dierence-in-dierence methodology. If we
assume that changes in the Mexican labor market aect the decision to migrate the same for all Mexicans
and that changes in the U.S. labor market inuence the decision to migrate the same for all migrants, then
10the double and triple estimators will control for the general changes in the source country and host country
labor markets. That is, we control for push factors, factors in the Mexican economy by comparing outcomes
of Mexican immigrant women with the outcomes of Mexican immigrant men. In addition, we control for pull
factors, factors in the US economy, by comparing the outcomes of Mexican immigrant women with other
Latin American immigrant women.
Our empirical strategy will be based on using the variation in equation (1) across dierent gender, age
and skill groups to show that the decision to migrate for women is more sensitive to migration costs than
it is for men. In particular, our model predicts the following two outcomes. First, a change in costs will
aect the migration decision of older potential migrants more than of younger migrants, and costs that dier
across gender will result in fewer older women migrating relative to men in the same age group. Thus, in
order to test whether the ows of older immigrant women relative to men have decreased during the period
of stringent border enforcement, we estimate the following probability equation:
















a Mit  Yait  Othit) + it
(2)
where Ait is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the immigrant belongs to each age category. The
three age categories included in this analysis are 18-27, 28-37, and 38 and older. Equation (2) is estimated
separately for each age category. Dummy variables for female and male, Fyit and Myit respectively, are
interacted with year dummy variables Ya, and the nativity dummy variables Mex and Oth. The three year
dummy variables Y1, Y2, and Y3 are for the years 1990, 2000, and 2007, respectively. The variable Mex takes
the value equal to one if the individual is a migrant from Mexico and the variable Oth takes the value equal
to one if the individual is a migrant from other Latin American countries or the Caribbean. The omitted
category is the number of male immigrants from Mexico in 1990. We are interested in testing whether we
observe fewer women migrating relative to men in the same age group over time. We begin with a rst
dierence which compares the outcomes of immigrants within gender across time. For example, the rst
11dierence estimates outcome of for Mexican women across time and is mex
3   mex
1 . The second dierence,




3 . Note that if push factors are similar for men and women, then this estimate
should be net of any push factors. The third dierence estimates the outcomes of immigrants, across gender






3 )). Again, if we assume that pull
factors are constant between immigrants from Mexico and immigrants from other Latin American countries,
then these estimates across time will net them out.
It is worthwhile to discuss our assumption that push factors are constant for men and women in Mexico.
Clearly, Figure 5B shows that the number of Mexican women who graduate from secundaria and preparatoria
has increased during the last 20 years. Similarly, Figures 6A and 6B show that the gender earnings gap
in Mexico has also increased, while the employment to population ratio has decreased. The widening of
the gender wage gap in Mexico during this period is consistent with the results observed by Artecona
and Cunningham (2002) and Juhn et al. (2006). Thus, if immigrant women from Mexico are randomly
drawn from the population in Mexico, then higher educational attainment among women in Mexico will be
associated with more highly educated women migrating to the U.S. { which is the opposite of our prediction.
In addition, greater gender earnings gaps will again be associated with more women migrating to the U.S., as
it widens the gap between expected earnings in both countries. Again, this is the opposite of our prediction.
Therefore, while the assumption that push factors are similar across gender is problematic, we argue that
any bias that results from this assumption will attenuate our estimates of the second dierence towards zero.
Similarly, our assumption that pull factors are the same for all migrants may be problematic if: a) other
Latin American immigrants are dierent than immigrants from Mexico, or b) other Latin American immi-
grants faced a similar increase in migrating costs during the same period of greater border enforcement.
Recall that Table 1 shows that other Latin American immigrants are on average more educated and earn
higher wages than Mexican immigrants. We control for age, education, and occupation dierences that will
net out some of the dierences between these groups. In addition, it is clear that some immigrants, particu-
larly Central Americans, face similar enhanced migration costs as a result of increased border enforcement.
In fact, if costs of migrating through Mexico have increased as well during the last 20 years, then Central
American immigrant women will face migration costs that are greater than the costs faced by Mexican
12immigrant women. While this is a possibility, any "pollution" of this type in our control group will again
attenuate the third dierence towards zero6.
In addition to estimating changes in migration by age category, we are also interested in how changes in
migration costs will aect the migration of highly educated potential immigrants relative to less educated
potential immigrants. Again, our model predicts that higher costs levied on women will result in fewer
highly educated immigrant women migrating to the U.S. relative to highly educated men. In order to test
whether the ows of high skilled immigrant women relative to men have decreased we estimate the following
probability equation:
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where Eit is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the immigrant belongs to each education category.
The four education categories included in the analysis are 0-8 years, 9-11 years, 12-15 years, and more








Our nal empirical test involves the labor market outcomes of immigrants in the United States. If an
increase in border enforcement results in a change in the composition of immigrants, then we would expect
to see that observed wages should increase among the demographic groups aected the most by the more
stringent border controls. In this case, we would expect to see that the wages for older and highly educated
women migrating from Mexico should be increasing relative to the wages of demographically equivalent men
from Mexico. As argued previously, to control for the overall reduction in the gender wage gap observed in the
United States (Blau and Kahn, 2006 or Weinberger and Kuhn, 2009) we use the evolution of gender dierences
in earnings for other Latin American immigrants as a control group. Thus, we should observe that the secular
change in the decline of gender wage gaps in the United States is similar across demographically equivalent
6The other natural control group, other US born Hispanics is perhaps even more problematic, and empirically unfeasible.
This workers do not choose whether or not to migrate, they have all their education in the US, and computationally we cannot
compare them with dierent arrival cohorts of immigrants
13Mexican and Latin American immigrants. If we observe dierences across demographically equivalent groups
then these dierences may be attributed to a dierence in the selection of immigrants.
Our baseline wage equation will compare the outcome of immigrants who arrived before 1984 and immi-
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it + it
(4)




> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
1 immigrant i in survey t arrived before 1985
2 immigrant i in survey t arrived 1985-1987
3 immigrant i in survey t arrived 1988-1991
4 immigrant i in survey t arrived 1992-1997
5 immigrant i in survey t arrived 1996-2000
6 immigrant i in survey t arrived after 2000
and x0
it is a set of observable characteristics that include controls for education, age, age squared, state of
residence, year, year interacted with gender, years in the U.S., and occupation. Again, as in the previous







6 )). Finally, and as mentioned above, we repeat equation (4) above for dierent subgroups. Our
theory predicts that the dierence-in-dierence-in-dierence estimator will be greatest among the groups
most likely to be aected by border enforcement, older and highly educated women from Mexico 8.
7We exclude observations for the 2008 ACS as we do not have any income information.
8Finally, it must be made clear that equations (2) and (3) are estimated with the sample of recent immigrants only (those who
have been in the United States for 5 or less years). This is because our interest is to measure ows of immigrants. In contrast,
equation (4) is estimated using the complete sample of single-never married immigrants, and we control for U.S. experience. We
do this in the spirit of having estimates that are comparable to those in the literature based on Borjas (1985, 1995). A short-
coming of this methodology is that across dierent cohorts we will not observe immigrants who returned to Mexico, and only
observe "survivors" from each cohort. That is, immigrants in earlier cohorts will be a subgroup of all immigrants in the cohort.
14Next we discuss why a decrease in the gender wage gap among Mexican immigrants can be explained
with a stronger immigrant selection among women. A decrease of the gender wage gap among recent cohorts
of immigrant women may be a consequence of dierent phenomena. For example, Figure 5B shows that
the level of education of women in Mexico has increased during the last twenty years. Greater schooling
for women would suggest that the average marginal productivity of Mexican women should increase relative
to the marginal productivity of men. This would be true for individuals staying in Mexico and for those
migrating to the U.S. As a result, we should observe not only that the gender wage gap among Mexicans
in the U.S. is narrowing, but that the gender wage gap in Mexico is also decreasing. However, the data in
Figure 6A is not consistent with this hypothesis and shows that the gender wage gap in Mexico has increased.
Alternatively, it may be possible that as the gender wage gap increases in Mexico (as shown in Figure 6A),
then high ability Mexican women will search for better opportunities and sort themselves out by migrating
to the U.S. Under this scenario, as labor market opportunities worsen for women, the number of immigrant
women from Mexico should increase faster than the number of immigrant men. However, this again conicts
with the results from Figure 3 which shows that the proportion of Mexican immigrant women has decreased.
Yet another alternative is that during the last 20 years there has been a change in traditional gender roles
in Mexico, which is manifested in higher labor market participation among Mexican women both in Mexico
and the U.S. This should result in more women also migrating, which again cannot be veried with the data
available to us that shows that while the raw number of immigrant women has increased, the number of
immigrant men has increased faster.
Finally, as argued above,it has been widely documented (Blau and Kahn, 2006; Kuhn and Weinberger,
2010) that the gender wage gap has decreased in the United States, and it is possible that a decrease in
the gender wage gap among Mexican immigrants is exclusively a consequence of a general trend in the U.S.
economy. While we cannot dierentiate between a decrease in the gender wage gap of Mexican immigrants
to that of the secular economy, we argue that this is unlikely to be the case because the decrease in the
gender wage gap is associated with stronger demand for women's labor, and this will increase the magnitude
of any pull factor and will encourage more Mexican women to migrate. In addition, in our empirical strategy
above we compare changes in the gender wage gap between Mexican immigrants and other Latin American
It is unclear to us whether there are any gender dierences in survivorship, and for our strategy to be valid there should there
should be no dierences in the probability of returning to Mexico { or women should be less likely than men to return.
15immigrants. Also note that our estimators ^  and ^  in equation 4 represent entry cohorts and include controls
for year of the survey interacted with gender, which should absorb this secular trend. If the decrease in the
gender wage gap among Mexican immigrants is exclusively the result of the secular trend in the U.S. economy,
then our estimates for Mexican immigrants and other Latin American immigrants should be similar. If we
nd dierent estimates between these two groups then we can hypothesize that our results suggest that
higher wages of Mexican immigrant women relative to men is a consequence of more stringent selection that
arises due to higher migrating costs.
5 Results
Table 2 presents the estimates from equation (2). The sample includes only immigrants who have migrated
within 5 years of each survey year. The rst two columns show estimates when the response variable is an
indicator of whether an immigrant is between 15 and 27 years of age, columns (3) and (4) present estimates
when the response variable is whether an immigrant is in the second age category (28-37), and the last
two columns show results when the response variable is whether an immigrant is in the third age category
(38 +). The odd numbered columns are results for the sample of recent Mexican immigrants and the even
numbered columns are results for the sample of recent immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean.
The dierence-in-dierence estimate shows gender dierences in the change across time in the probability
that an immigrant belongs to each age category. The dierence-in-dierence-in-dierence estimate shows
nativity dierences in the change across gender and time in the probability that an immigrant belongs to
each age category. A positive estimate of the triple estimate suggests that the change in the probability that
a Mexican immigrant woman belongs to that age group is greater than the change in the probability for
men, and that the dierence across gender is greater for Mexican immigrants than the same dierence for
other Latin American immigrants.
The results in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 suggest that the fraction of women from Mexico who migrate
to the United States after the age of 37 is decreasing. This is in contrast to men and other Latin American
immigrants, where the fraction of individuals who migrate after the age of 37 is increasing for men and women.
The triple dierence estimate suggests that there is decrease of two percentage points in the probability that
16an immigrant over the age of 37 is a woman from Mexico. This estimate is marginally statistically signicant
with a p-value of .094. In comparison, the triple estimates from the 15-27 age category and the 28-37
age category are statistically insignicant. These point estimates, while statistically insignicant, provide
support for the predictions in our theoretical framework which suggest that an increase in migration cost
that falls disproportionally on women will have a greater disincentive eect among older women, given that
the present value of all future benets accrued from migration are smaller than for younger migrants.
Next, we explore how migration has changed among various education categories as a result of greater
border enforcement. Estimates from equation (3) are found in Table 3. Similar to Table 2, the results are
presented separately for both Mexican immigrants and Latin American immigrants and for each education
category (less than 9 years, 9-11 years, 12-15 years, more than 16 years). Recall that the average number of
years of education for Mexican immigrant women is 10.3 years, hence the results from column (3), column
(5) and column (7) will represent the right part of the education distribution. The results in column
(3) and (4) suggest that the number of women who completed secundaria or middle school in Mexico is
decreasing relative men with similar education, yet this dierence across gender is not dierent from other
Latin American immigrants. The results in column (5) and column (7) suggest that the fraction of Mexican
immigrant women that are highly educated has increased by less than the proportion of immigrants from
Latin America (in column (6) and column (8)). The estimates in column (7) suggest that the proportion of
female migrants with more than twelve years of education has increased at a faster rate than the proportion
of male migrants with the same education level. This nding is consistent with the rising level of schooling
among women residing in Mexico.
Yet comparing the estimates for highly educated women from Mexico and other Latin American countries
we see that the proportion of highly educated women from Mexico has increased at a lower pace than the
proportion of other women from Latin America. These results support our theoretical prediction that since
the relative returns to education are high in Mexico, an increase in migration costs that fall more heavily
on women should have a stronger eect on the migration of highly educated women. Thus, given the rising
level of schooling among women in Mexico coupled with the unchanged migration of highly educated women
relative to men, the evidence suggests that in the face of rising migration costs, highly educated women
are choosing to remain in Mexico more than women from other Latin American countries. Importantly,
17the triple dierence estimator for immigrants with less than 9 years of schooling suggests that the ow of
immigrants in this group has increased fastest among Mexican women than other Latin American women.
Table 4 presents the estimated dierences in log wages across immigrant cohorts from equation (4). The
sample includes all single immigrants and is no longer restricted to only those who have migrated within 5
years of each survey year. Columns 1 and 2 present results when no control variables are included in the
wage equation. Columns 3 and 4 and columns 5 and 6 present results when control variables and occupation
xed eects are added to the estimating equation respectively. The dierence-in-dierence estimator shows
the change in log wages across gender cohorts. The dierence-in-dierence-dierence estimator shows the
change in log wages across gender and nativity cohorts.
When demographic variables and xed eects are included in the estimating equation, the change in log
wages across gender cohorts is positive and statistically signicant for Mexican immigrants and for other
Latin American immigrants. This suggests that female Mexican immigrants from more recent cohorts are
performing better than men in the same cohort when compared with women in earlier cohorts. In addition,
the change is greater for Mexican immigrants. For example, column 6 reveals that once occupation xed
eects are added, the dierence-in-dierence-in-dierence estimator is positive indicating that the Mexican
gender wage dierence has decreased by 6 percentage points faster than the wage dierence for other Latin
American immigrants (this is statistically signicant with a p-value of 0.014). Thus, the change in log wages
across gender is greater for Mexican immigrants relative to other Latin American immigrants even within
the same occupations and education levels. This results suggests that demographically equivalent women
from Mexico are doing better in the labor force compared to their males counterparts, and this dierence is
greater than that of other Latin American women.
Finally, we are interested in whether the trends we observe in Table 4 continue to hold when we evaluate
changes in the gender wage gap for dierent age and education categories. Table 5 shows the results when
we compare less educated (9 or less years of education) to highly educated immigrants (more than 9 years of
education), and then we compare young immigrants (less than 30 years) to older immigrants (more than 30
years). These estimates include all demographic characteristics and occupation xed eects. Again, because
higher migrating costs will aect older and highly educated women the most, we will expect that the change
in ability will be greatest among these groups, and hence the change in their hourly earnings.
18Focusing on education in columns 1-4, the dierence-in-dierence-in-dierence estimator is positive, but
statistically insignicant for less educated immigrants, but positive and statistically signicant for highly
educated immigrants with a p-value of .006. Suggesting, again, that highly educated Mexican immigrant
women are doing better than their male counterparts, and this advantage is greater than among other Latin
American immigrants. This is consistent with our theoretical prediction that the change in wages of women
relative to men across cohorts should be greater for highly educated immigrants and that this change should
be greater for Mexican immigrants relative to other immigrants from Latin America. However, the results
are less conclusive when wages are evaluated by age categories. Columns 5-8 show that both dierence-in-
dierence-in-dierence estimators are positive and the point estimate for older workers is almost twice the
magnitude as for younger workers, still the triple dierence is not statistically dierent to zero.
6 Conclusion
Since the 1990s, the U.S. has made considerable eorts to curb undocumented immigration. As a result of
making it more dicult for migrants to cross the U.S.-Mexico border through traditional crossing channels,
the costs of undocumented migration have increased. However, there is no reason to assume that these costs
are the same for men and women. Women are more vulnerable to the physical dangers of crossing the border
illegally and as the number of female-headed households in Mexico continues to grow, they are also more
likely than men to make multiple trips across the border.
In this paper, we have examined the extent to which an increase in the costs of crossing the border has
aected the composition of Mexican immigrant women relative to men. While we are unable to measure the
direct impact of border costs on the selection of undocumented immigrants, we propose a set of theoretical
predictions based on a standard model of the decision to migrate and examine the extent to which these
theoretical predictions are observed in the migration and wage patterns of Mexican immigrants. In particular,
we predicted that an increase in migration costs would result in the proportion of female immigrants to
decline, and with a larger decrease for older and highly educated immigrants relative to younger and less
educated immigrants.
Estimates from our probability equations provide evidence in support of these predictions. In order
19to provide additional evidence of the changing composition of Mexican immigrant women relative to men,
we also examined the change in the gender wage dierences across immigrant cohorts. We nd evidence
that supports our prediction that wages among Mexican women are growing faster than wages of men, and
this dierence is greater than among other Latin American immigrants. In addition, we nd evidence that
wages of women in the groups most vulnerable to border enforcement, older and highly educated women,
have increased faster than the wages of their males counterparts and again dierences are greatest among
Mexican immigrants.
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28Table 1: Summary Statistics for Immigrants
Mexican Latin American
Immigrants Immigrants
Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log Hourly Wage 1.555 1.462 1.734 1.631
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Employed 0.801 0.378 0.742 0.526
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of Schooling 10.238 10.340 11.795 12.197
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 28.216 29.749 31.394 32.973
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Single 0.523 0.305 0.503 0.370
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.436 0.605 0.428 0.496
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 98,738 67,781 55,665 54,579
Notes: Sample includes immigrants between the ages of 18-64
who have been in the U.S. for 5 years or less. Standard errors
in parentheses.
Source: 1990 and 2000 Census and 2006-2008 American
Community Survey
29Table 2: Recent Immigrants in the U.S. by Age Category
15-27 years 28-37 years 37+ years
Mexicans Other Latin Mexicans Other Latin Mexicans Other Latin
Americans Americans Americans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fem1990 0.139 0.003 -0.074 0.001 -0.065 -0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
fem2000 0.086 -0.034 -0.035 0.018 -0.050 0.016
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
fem2007 -0.014 -0.084 0.050 0.044 -0.036 0.039
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
male1990 -0.202 0.103 0.099
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
male2000 -0.056 -0.231 0.033 0.093 0.024 0.137
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
male2007 -0.173 -0.283 0.100 0.117 0.073 0.167
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
di-in-di estimate 0.020 -0.006 0.024 0.030 -0.044 -0.024
p value 0.094 0.667 0.023 0.012 0.000 0.012
di-in-di-in-di estimate 0.025 -0.005 -0.020
p value 0.148 0.747 0.094
Notes Sample includes single, adult, immigrants between the ages of 18-64 who have been in the U.S.
for 5 years or less. The di-in-di estimate is fem2007-fem1990-male2007. The di-in-di-di
estimate is the di-in-di estimate for Mexican immigrants minus the di-in-di estimate for Latin
American immigrants. Standard errors in parentheses.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Table 4: Ordinary Least Suqares: Dependent Variable Log Hourly Earnings
Mexicans Latin Mexicans Latin Mexicans Latin
Americans Americans Americans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fem*1984 -0.333 0.031 -0.324 -0.104 -0.256 -0.128
( 0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
fem*1984-1987 -0.438 -0.153 -0.282 -0.112 -0.224 -0.117
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
fem*1988-1991 -0.437 -0.223 -0.249 -0.135 -0.202 -0.143
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
fem*1992-1996 -0.388 -0.181 -0.221 -0.129 -0.166 -0.138
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
fem*1995-1997 -0.434 -0.189 -0.150 -0.021 -0.109 -0.053
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
fem*1998-1999 -0.463 -0.289 -0.163 -0.105 -0.116 -0.109
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
fem*2000+ -0.538 -0.357 -0.177 -0.099 -0.128 -0.092
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016)
male*1984 0.246 0.108 0.062
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
male*1984-1987 -0.136 0.064 -0.017 0.071 -0.016 0.032
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
male*1988-1991 -0.169 0.003 -0.016 0.052 -0.021 0.012
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
male*1992-1996 -0.177 0.001 -0.001 0.061 -0.011 0.021
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
male*1995-1997 -0.236 -0.061 0.043 0.103 0.020 0.053
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
male*1998-1999 -0.297 -0.094 0.005 0.080 -0.014 0.032
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
male*2000+ -0.330 -0.175 0.042 0.089 0.013 0.039
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
demographic variables no no yes yes yes yes
xed eects no no no no yes yes
di-in-di 0.125 0.033 0.104 0.024 0.116 0.059
p-value 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.189 0.000 0.001
di-in-di-in-di 0.092 0.080 0.057
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.014
R-square 0.098 0.198 0.278
N 425,813 425,813 425,813
Notes: Sample includes single, adult, immigrants between the ages of 18-64.The di-in-di
estimate is fem*2000-fem*1984-male*2000. The di-in-di-di estimate is the
di-in-di estimate for Mexican immigrants minus the di-in-di estimate for other Latin American
immigrants. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: 1990 and 2000 Census and 2006-2008 American Community Survey
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